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Writing in the International Journal of Law and Psychiatry,
Fleur Johns recently indicted international refugee law – the
ostensible source of refugee rights and solutions – as being
instead “a producer of... pathology.” She writes:
The Refugee Convention classifies refugees as “problem[s]” and
“cause[s] of tension” and works towards resolving these “prob-
lem[s]” and “tension[s].”.. Yet where... lies the “problem” to be
cured by recourse to international refugee law and lawyers?
Does it reside in the wars, famines and political conflicts that...
drive people from their countries of nationality? Does it reside
in the trauma of border-transgressions to which refugees are
subject...? Does it reside in the callousness of governments and
judges, or the xenophobia of the constituencies that support
them? [Or] [d]oes it rest as much... with international refugee
law’s tendency to insist upon the normality of stable and endur-
ing national attachments; [and] its innate preference for lim-
ited, fear-laden divergences therefrom?1
There is an urgent need, Dr. Johns contends, for “... inter-
national refugee lawyers... [to] take a moment to question
the pre-eminence of the therapeutic mode in their profes-
sional work and its role in sustaining a prescriptive normal-
ity that tends to diagnose the refugee as flawed and requiring
correction...”2 She concludes,
Might our instruments and strategies of cure be tainted by the
very drives against which we supposedly labor in the interna-
tional refugee law field? Might insistence that international
refugee law has or should have therapeutic, corrective effects
comprise part of the problem towards which it ostensibly di-
rects those curative efforts?3
My first instinct was to contest Dr. Johns’s charge. As part
of international law, created and managed by states, the
refugee law regime of necessity achieves humanitarian good
in the margins of a  more fundamental commitment  to
preserve state interests. This is not only a description of the
ground reality, but may in fact be a source of strength:
refugee law persists in large measure because governments
have a self-interest in its retention. And more specifically, is
it really such a bad thing, in a world in which sovereign
power still matters, to commit ourselves to enabling refugees
– that is, persons disfranchised from their own state – some-
how to secure either a new national attachment, or be re-
stored to that with their country of origin? In practical terms,
is that not a critical means of restoring dignity and self-de-
termination?
Yet as I reflected more on Dr. Johns’s argument, I recog-
nized that much of her charge is sound if directed not at
international refugee law as authentically conceived, but
rather at the distortion of refugee law that has emerged from
recent interstate and, in particular, agency reinterpretations
of refugee law.
The argument I wish to make is that a legal regime which
is in truth fundamentally oriented to the promotion of
autonomy of refugees has been “pathologized” to focus
instead on finding cures to refugeehood. A regime which
was actually established to guarantee refugees lives in dig-
nity until and unless either the cause of their flight is firmly
eradicated or the refugee himself or herself chooses to pursue
some alternative solution to their disfranchisement has
now become a regime which labours nearly single-mind-
edly to design and implement top-down solutions which
“fix the refugee problem.”
In short, we increasingly see a regime oriented not to the
facilitation of “refugee solutions,” but instead to the imple-
mentation of “solutions to refugeehood.”
The Fallacy of “Solutions”
To begin, I wish to be clear that I am not opposed to the
notion of “solutions” as such. Solutions, at least for those
who want them, are of course good things. But refugee
protection, despite much rhetoric from the United Nations
3
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since the mid-
1990s to the contrary,4 is not primarily about looking for
solutions. Refugee protection is instead fundamentally ori-
ented to creating conditions of independence and dignity
which enable refugees themselves to decide how they wish to
cope with their predicaments. It is about ensuring auton-
omy, not about the pursuit of externally conceived “fixes.”
Increasingly, though, there is impatience with the duty
simply to honour the rights of persons who are Convention
refugees. The focus of much contemporary discourse is
instead on the importance of defining and pursuing so-
called “durable solutions” to refugee flight.5 The main goal
of a refugee protection regime oriented towards “durable
solutions” is effectively to find a way to bring refugee status
to an end – whether by means of return to the country of
origin, resettlement elsewhere, or naturalization in the host
country.
Indeed, those who focus on achieving durable solutions
increasingly regard respect for refugee rights as little more
than a “second best” option, to be pursued only until a
durable solution can be implemented. UNHCR’s Executive
Committee, for example, has endorsed a conclusion “[r]ec-
ognizing the need for Governments, UNHCR and the in-
ternational community to continue to respond to the
asylum and assistance needs of refugees until durable solu-
tions are found [emphasis added].”6 This position is in line
with the view once expressed by a senior official of the
UNHCR that
protection should be seen as a temporary holding arrangement
between the departure and return to the original community,
or as a bridge between one community and another. Legal
protection is the formal structure of that temporary holding
arrangement or bridge.7
Despite the technical accuracy of the view that protection
is a duty which inheres only for the duration of risk, that
duty may be inadvertently degraded by referring to it as
simply an “arrangement or bridge” rather than as a legiti-
mate alternative to the pursuit of a “durable solution” to
refugee status. This very simple notion – that the recogni-
tion and honouring of refugee rights is itself a fully respect-
able, indeed often quite a desirable response to involuntary
migration – can too easily be eclipsed by the rush to locate
and implement so-called “durable solutions.”8
In contrast to this emphasis on the pursuit of durable
solutions, the Refugee Convention gives priority to allow-
ing refugees to make their own decisions about how best to
respond to their predicament. As a non-governmental
commentator astutely observed, one of the strengths of the
refugee rights regime is that it eschews “the false notion of
‘durable solutions’ to refugee problems, especially as refu-
gees [may] have no idea as to how long they are likely to
stay in a particular country.”9 Rather than propelling refu-
gees towards some means of ending their stay abroad, the
Refugee Convention emphasizes the right of refugees to
take the time they need to decide when and if they wish to
pursue a durable solution.
In some cases, refugees will choose not to pursue any
solution right away, but will prefer simply to establish a
reasonably normal life in the state party where they sought
protection. This is a valid alternative, which may not law-
fully be interfered with by either governments or interna-
tional agencies. Because refugee rights inhere as the result
of the individual’s predicament and consequent status –
rather than as a result of any formal process of status
adjudication – they provide refugees with a critical, self-
executing arsenal of entitlements which may be invoked in
any of the state parties to the Refugee Convention. They
afford refugees a real measure of autonomy and security to
devise the solutions which they judge most suited to their
own circumstances and ambitions, and to vary those deci-
sions over time.
Yet when the focus is on the pursuit of “solutions” rather
than  on respect  for refugee  rights as such, the  drive  is
fundamentally to re-establish systemic homeostasis, which
means that any conflicting priorities of refugees themselves
are secondary, if relevant at all.
Nowhere can this risk be seen more clearly than in the
context of the so-called “voluntary repatriation” frame-
work.
“Voluntary Repatriation”
As we all know, there is strong support for regarding repa-
triation as the best solution to refugeehood. UNHCR’s Ex-
ecutive Committee, for example, has “not[ed] that [while]
voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement
are the traditional durable solutions for refugees, . . . volun-
tary repatriation is the preferred solution, when feasible [em-
phasis added].”10 As the language of the Executive
Committee makes clear, support is not normally expressed
for “repatriation” as a solution to refugeehood, but rather
for “voluntary repatriation.”11 Which sounds nice, right?
Wrong.
On closer examination, the routine use of this “voluntary
repatriation” terminology can be seen to be problematic.
While anchored in the language of the UNHCR Statute,12
and hence logically taken into account in determining what
sorts of role the agency can take on,13 the rights of state
parties to the Refugee Convention are quite differently
conceived.14 The Convention allows governments to bring
refugee status to an end only when there has been either
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“voluntary re-establishment” (not repatriation) or when
there has been a “fundamental change of circumstances” in
the country of origin which justifies the cessation of refugee
status (not when UNHCR decides that the moment is right
to promote “voluntary repatriation”).
To be clear, there are only two relevant, Convention-
based means of bringing refugee status to an end.
On the one hand, it may be the case that a person who is
a refugee – that is, who continues to be objectively at risk
of being persecuted – nonetheless decides to go back to the
country where that risk exists. In so doing, the refugee is
simply exercising the right of every person to return to his
or her own country.15 Refugee status may come to an end
if – but only if – the voluntary return amounts to re-estab-
lishment in the country of origin.16 Re-establishment is not
the same as return or repatriation. Simply put, the refugee
who returns only loses his or her refugee status once a
durable, ongoing presence in the home country is estab-
lished. Up to that point, she remains a refugee and is legally
entitled to go back to the asylum country and to resume
refugee protection there if things do not work out as hoped
in the country of origin.17
The alternative solution to refugeehood allows the gov-
ernment of a state party to terminate refugee status and
require the return of a former refugee to his or her country
of origin where there has been a “fundamental change of
circumstances”18 that is significant and substantively rele-
vant; which change is enduring; and which results in the
practical and dependable delivery of “protection” in the
home country.19 If – and only if – these demanding criteria
are met, return need not be voluntary20 so long as it is
carried out in a rights-regarding way.21
Where do these notions of “voluntary re-establishment”
and “cessation due to a fundamental change of circum-
stances” tie in to UNHCR’s favoured notion of “voluntary
repatriation”? In principle, “voluntary repatriation” should
really just define a UNHCR-based support mechanism to
either of these Convention-based options. If a refugee
wants to go home with a view to re-establishing himself or
herself there, or if a government has validly terminated
refugee status based on a “fundamental change of circum-
stances” there, then UNHCR as an agency is empowered to
facilitate “voluntary repatriation” to the country of origin.22
In fact, particularly in the less developed world, “volun-
tary repatriation” has insinuated itself into the Convention-
based rights regime, and has in practice become something
of a substitute for either “voluntary re-establishment” or
for “cessation due to a fundamental change of circum-
stances.” In the result, refugees who choose to “test the
waters” by return to their country of origin find that they
are deemed to have lost their status by reason of “voluntary
repatriation” even though the durability of stay required by
the “voluntary re-establishment” test has in no way been
met.
Even more seriously, governments in much of the politi-
cal South erroneously assert the right to terminate refugee
status on the grounds that UNHCR is promoting the “vol-
untary repatriation” of a given refugee population – even
though the demanding criteria for cessation due to a fun-
damental change of circumstances could in no sense be
satisfied. One might have hoped that states relying on the
UNHCR “voluntary repatriation” standard would simply
inject a volition requirement into their examination of
whether refugee status can lawfully be withdrawn due to a
fundamental change of circumstances in the country of
origin. This “best of all worlds” option – the risk has clearly
gone away, and this refugee is willing to go home – has not
materialized. Instead, the pattern is for governments in
most of the less-developed world to take UNHCR involve-
ment in a given repatriation effort – relying on its agency-
based “voluntary repatriation” standard – as a sufficient
basis in and of itself for the termination of their own duty
to protect the refugees in question, with no real attention
being paid to the actual legal criteria for cessation of status
(much less to volition). These governments simply end
refugee status for groups of refugees based on the legally
irrelevant fact that UNHCR is facilitating that group’s vol-
untary repatriation.23
In each of these ways, then, the “voluntary repatriation”
language – which sounds positive, rights-regarding,
autonomy-affirming – is, in practice, being relied upon to
deny refugee rights.
Sometimes  this  superficial reliance  on the  fact  of  an
ongoing UNHCR “voluntary repatriation” effort is no
more than a completely disingenuous ploy to justify a
government’s involuntary repatriation initiatives. In an ex-
treme case, the Tanzanian government invoked UNHCR
voluntary repatriation efforts as justification for its own
decision in December 1996 that “all Rwandese refugees in
Tanzania are expected to return home by 31 December
1996.”24 This announcement, said to have been “endorsed
and co-signed by the UNHCR,”25 resulted in the return of
more than 500,000 refugees within the month.26 Yet the
criteria  for  lawful  cessation of refugee status  could  not
possibly have been met in the circumstances: fair trials were
only beginning in Rwanda, disappearances and deliberate
killings were continuing there, and there was no reason
whatever to believe that Rwanda could meet the basic needs
of the returning refugees.27
As bad as it is for governments disingenuously to invoke
UNHCR “voluntary repatriation” efforts as authority for
their own less-than-voluntary return initiatives, there is a
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second – and in my view more pernicious – dimension to
the problematic reliance on “voluntary repatriation” stand-
ards in lieu of true Convention cessation criteria. As the
“supporting role” played by UNHCR in the unlawful repa-
triation of Rwandans from Tanzania  suggests, the risks
which flow from reliance on the “voluntary repatriation”
paradigm may not be simply the consequence of host state
manipulation. Reliance on the “voluntary repatriation” al-
ternative to the real, Convention-based cessation standard
is also prevalent as the result of institutional over-reaching
by UNHCR itself.
UNHCR has now taken positions which suggest that
governments should be guided by its institutional decisions
about when to pursue repatriation in deciding when refu-
gees should go home. Indeed, such deference is now said by
UNHCR to be part of the “responsibilities of the host
country.”28 Thus, in 2002 UNHCR announced that it had
received “assurances [from] the Tanzanian and Rwandan
governments that security in Rwanda had improved [em-
phasis added],”29 and sanctioned the voluntary repatriation
of the remaining 20,000 Rwandan refugees living in Tanza-
nia.30 Yet even the spokesperson for a partner agency par-
ticipating in the ensuing government-orchestrated
“voluntary” repatriation conceded that the repatriation ac-
tually conducted by Tanzania relied upon an “impetus” in
the form of “verbal pressure”31 – in particular, a firm year-
end deadline for the refugees’ departure.32 In at least some
instances, officials implementing the program used brute
force to compel even long-term Rwandan residents to leave
the country.33
Indeed, against the backdrop of UNHCR calls for repa-
triation, even host governments firmly committed to pro-
tection may on occasion feel under pressure to acquiesce in
the agency’s repatriation plans. For example, Zambia raised
concerns about the risks posed by land mines for Angolan
refugees slated for repatriation by UNHCR, but was report-
edly lobbied by UNHCR to acquiesce in the return. The
agency sought to reassure Zambia that even though many
areas were “heavily mined . . . ‘[w]ith the funding UNHCR
has received, we will be expanding our presence in those
areas of resettlement to ensure that people are reminded of
the threat of land mines. So the problem is addressed (em-
phasis added).”34
The UNHCR’s ambition effectively to determine the
issue of cessation for state parties – and to do so by reference
not to Article 1(C)(5) of the Refugee Convention, but
drawing on its agency-based “voluntary repatriation”
standard – can be seen even more clearly in the assertion by
the then-High Commissioner for Refugees during a visit to
Africa in April 2003 that “Rwanda is safe for refugees in
Tanzania and Uganda . . . ‘In Tanzania, we informed the
refugees that they could return to Rwanda. Some  have
returned, but many remain,’ he said . . . Such people, he
said, were ‘not refugees anymore’ (emphasis added).”’35
By taking such a legally unfounded, aggressive stance –
not only effectively purporting to “determine” the issue of
cessation under the Refugee Convention (which is not a
UNHCR responsibility or prerogative) but to do so based
not on the Convention standards, but rather on the basis of
his agency’s policy predispositions – themselves often
rooted in political, economic, or other concerns36 – the
then-High Commissioner took the distortion of refugee law
by reference to agency standards to a  new height. The
subordination of the real requirements of the Convention
– that is, whether there is a fundamental, substantively
relevant, enduring, and protection-delivering change of
circumstance in the country of origin – to UNHCR’s insti-
tutional preparedness to approve “voluntary repatriation”
– whatever that means, on a given day – is not lawful and
has proved extraordinarily dangerous on the ground.
To return to my overarching theme, the distortion of
true cessation criteria by states and the UNHCR is impor-
tant not only for its own sake, but because it stands as a
shockingly clear example of how the current fixation with
finding “solutions to refugeehood” has in practice trumped
the commitment to honouring the rights of refugeees as
codified in the Convention. Repatriation – often not really
voluntary, often not really safe, often not really warranted
by international law – nonetheless delivers a “solution to
refugeehood.” It thus serves the political and economic
interests of host governments anxious to divest themselves
of protective responsibilities. The rush to repatriation also
serves the interests of the refugee agency itself, which is
increasingly prone to trumpet its own value to powerful
states not simply by reference to the quality of life it has
secured for refugees, but instead by pointing to its success
in bringing refugee status to an end.37
Compounding the problem, developed governments,
with the active participation of the UNHCR, are presently
engaged in efforts systematically to deem refugee status
unwarranted in the political North where it can in principle
be secured closer to home, i.e. in the political South. While
refugee law is not necessarily breached by initiatives of this
kind, legal standards are infringed if return is effected to
places where “solutions to refugeehood” are pursued at the
expense of refugee rights. And to be candid, one’s suspi-
cions in this regard are aroused when the required quality
of protection in destination countries is described by refer-
ence to amorphous, legally unfounded phrases such as
“effective protection” – not “protection,” full stop. While
the meaning of “protection” in refugee law is fairly clear –
including, at a minimum, respect for the Refugee Conven-
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tion’s definition and rights regime – the consistent official
preference for the more fungible “effective protection” la-
bel is presumably of some normative significance. In par-
ticular, does anyone seriously imagine that “effective
protection” would be deemed not to exist in a country
which effects  repatriation  with UNHCR  blessing,  albeit
premature or unwarranted based on the cessation criteria
of the Convention itself?
What, then, is the challenge for the refugee advocacy
community?
First, refugee advocates today need to learn the Refugee
Convention “cold,” and to understand its relationship to
international human rights law more generally. In an era in
which there is no more than selective ability and inclination
to combat human rights abuse abroad, and in which tradi-
tional human rights law affords few immediate and self-ac-
tuating sources of relief, refugee law stands out as the single
most effective, relatively autonomous remedy for  those
who simply cannot safely remain in their own countries.
The surrogate protection of human rights required by refu-
gee law is too valuable a tool not to be widely understood,
and conscientiously implemented.
Second and related, we must refuse to buy into the
propensity of states and the UNHCR to misinterpret the
Convention so as to give priority to the search for “solutions
to refugeehood” over “refugee solutions.” The goal of refu-
gee law is not to pathologize refugeehood and hence single-
mindedly to pursue means of “curing” that status. To the
contrary, refugee law exists precisely in order to ensure that
refugees enjoy true dignity and quality of life for as long as
it takes them to decide for themselves how best to cope, to
respond, and to rebuild their lives. That prerogative cannot
be traded away by governments, by the UNHCR, or by us.
Put simply, refugee rights are not negotiable.
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